In the lead up to its October 25 presidential election, Cote d’Ivoire, Francophone West Africa’s economic hub, stands at a critical juncture where history, politics, security and public trust intersect. This is no routine democratic exercise—it is a national stress test, the outcome of which will resonate far beyond Ivorian borders.
This article examines the key political, security, regional and international factors that threaten the stability and integrity of the election.
Incumbent president Alassane Ouattara’s announcement on July 29 that he would seek a fourth term and the exclusion of key opposition candidates, notably Tidjane Thiam and Laurent Gbagbo, have reignited a long-standing debate about power, legality, and legitimacy in West African politics. While the 2016 constitutional change offers him a legal path, it is widely perceived as an erosion of democratic norms.
The exclusion of key opposition figures and an electoral system widely accused of bias raised fears about whether the vote will proceed smoothly. Tensions are rising, as no Ivorian presidential election since 1995 has resulted in a peaceful handover of power. The October election is fast approaching amid deep frustration and fear of unrest and violence. The campaigns set to start on October 10 will be critical for peace in the days leading to the polls.
A Fourth term—Or a Fourth turning?
In a televised speech, Ouattara described his candidacy as essential for stability, continuity, and the completion of unfinished reforms. He has argued that “duty can sometimes transcend the word given in good faith” and highlighted the need for “experience” to face challenges. His supporters point to robust economic growth and major infrastructure projects, viewing his leadership as a bulwark against turbulence in the Sahel.” Critics, however, see a troubling pattern that echoes past crises and is characterized by the extension of one’s grip on power.”
President Ouattara’s candidacy came as no surprise to many observers, as there was no designated successor from his party. This was unlike the 2020 elections, when he designated Amadou Gon Koulibaly, who died before the elections, making Ouattara reverse his decision and announced his candidacy.
According to the Constitutional Council, the president has the right to run again. He made a point of recalling, in the announcement of his candidacy, that the constitution “authorizes him to serve another term”. In 2020, his opponents invoked article 55 of the constitution, which stipulates that the president “is only eligible for re-election once”, to challenge his participation. But the Constitutional Council considered that the adoption of a new constitution in 2016, a year after Ouattara’s second election, instituted a “Third Republic”, resetting the counters and allowing him to run again for two more terms in 2020 and 2025.
Races for the Presidency in Cote d’Ivoire, which boasts the largest economy in French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa, have been marred by violence for the past three decades. Many are concerned that the 2025 polls will be fraught with violence, especially since key contenders have been excluded, the electoral system’s fairness is contested, and identity-based rhetoric is resurgent.
As in the 2020 elections, when violence left 85 people dead, Ouattara is ignoring critics to run again.
In fragile democracies, the letter of the law is often bent to accommodate incumbents’ ambitions. While this may pass legal scrutiny, it undermines the fragile trust on which democratic stability depends.
The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) registered about sixty candidates, including the two opposition figures – Gbagbo and Thiam – who were declared ineligible. The IEC transmitted the files to the Constitutional Council, which is responsible for validating the final list of candidates. The Council published the final list on September 10.
The question for 2025 is not simply who will win, but whether Côte d’Ivoire’s political culture will choose renewal over repetition.
Exclusion of key opposition figures
The constitutional Council barred the key opposition leaders, ex-president Gbagbo and former banker Thiam from standing in the presidential election on the grounds they had been removed from the electoral register. Meanwhile, Gbagbo’s ex-wife Simone Gbagbo, President of the Mouvement des Générations Capables (MGC), was declared eligible to run for the presidency. Unlike her former husband, Laurent, Simone received presidential amnesty, allowing her to engage freely in politics. Three other candidates, including Jean Louis Billon (dissident from PDCI of Tidjane Thiam), Ahoua Don Mello (former member of PPA-CI of Laurent Gbagbo) have been declared eligible to contest for the presidency.
Before the Constitutional Council’s definitive ruling, and despite their exclusion from the elections, Thiam and Gbagbo had submitted their candidacy files to the IEC. This situation leaves no room for presenting an alternative candidate by the PPA-CI and PDCI. Many observers were thinking the 2024 Senegalese presidential election scenario will prevail in Cote d’Ivoire, whereby Bassirou Diomaye Faye ran for the presidency in replacement of Ousmane Sonko. However, the attempt by Billon to run for the presidency in replacement of Thiam was met with severe sanctions, leading to his expulsion from the PDCI.
Even more troubling than Ouattara’s candidacy is the hollowing out of the opposition. This election will be remembered less for the diversity of candidates than for the absence of four of the most influential political figures in the country. The 2025 election is no exception to the rule of disqualification of candidates that marked the elections of 1995, 2000, 2015 and 2020. Official explanations vary, from criminal convictions, nationality disputes, and procedural technicalities, but the pattern is unmistakable as one by one, credible challengers have been sidelined. The probability of seeing the convictions lifted before the polls to allow these political figures to run for president is very slim. Meanwhile, the electoral commission has recently announced that there will be no voter list revision before October 25th, ending any possibility of Tidjane Thiam running for president.
Meanwhile, the divided Ivorian opposition further remains hindered by legal mechanisms excluding key candidates. In an effort to marshal their efforts, 25 opposition parties formed the Coalition for Peaceful Alternation in Côte d’Ivoire (CAP-CI) in March. However, the alliance has been unable to agree on a single candidate, underscoring the fragmentation and rivalries among the opposition. CAP-CI may nonetheless play an instrumental role if no candidate wins a 50 percent majority in the first round and the election goes to a second round between the top two candidates.
Across the continent, ruling elites are discovering that elections need not be abolished to be emptied of meaning. The form can remain while the substance disappears. When that happens, citizens lose faith not only in politicians, but in democracy itself. This could ignite historical frustrations and raise the specter of violence as those who feel excluded are left with no legal, judicial or institutional recourse.
Repression in real time
In recent months, state repression of the opposition has reportedly escalated. Opposition rallies have been banned under the guise of maintaining public order. Activists face arrests on what critics describe as “trumped-up charges”. Two senior members of former president Gbagbo’s party, including a former minister, were detained on 8 August, 2025 in connection with protests in Yopougon. Also, the arrest of 11 opposition activists has been reported in relation to the Youpougon incidents. Meanwhile, several thousands of supporters of the PPA-CI and the Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) marched peacefully through Yopougon to protest against Ouattara’s bid for a fourth term and to call for the reinstatement of opposition leaders barred from the electoral roll.”
The shrinking of civic space leaves grievances with fewer peaceful outlets, increasing the risk that frustration could find more dangerous expressions. Ivorians are well aware of the cost of elections stripped of credibility.
The Cote d’Ivoire Catholic Bishops Conference has raised concerns about the risk of electoral unrest and has called for dialogue and inclusive elections.
Credibility of the process
The definitive exclusion of key opponents and the filtering of candidacies through the sponsorship system have polarized the debate in this pre-campaign period. The independence and credibility of the IEC, the Constitutional Council and the judiciary will be under intense scrutiny, especially in their handling of rejected candidacies and disputed results. Particular attention will also be paid to the transparency of the electoral process, equitable access to the media and the management of disputes.
Polls in the context of a volatile neighborhood fighting jihadists
Côte d’Ivoire’s political fragility is compounded by its geographic position. The country faces deteriorated relations with its northern neighbors Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, triggered by diplomatic standoffs and shifting alliances such as the emergence of the Alliance of the Sahel States (AES). These tensions, beside their ability to jeopardize vital economic ties, regional security cooperation, and social integration, fail to consider the complex regional environment which can exacerbate internal vulnerabilities, making the 2025 election a critical juncture for both national and regional stability and diplomacy.
Cote d’Ivoire faces increased security threat from jihadists operating in the Sahel. To the north, the border with Burkina Faso grows more unstable as Sahelian jihadist groups already active in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso probe Ivorian territory. In recent months, there has been a marked increase in attacks by armed groups and terrorists on military positions and raids targeting civilians. In August, armed men from Burkina Faso killed civilians along the Cote d’Ivoire border. The government has responded with militarized security measures, deploying troops and tightening border controls.
While effective in preventing large-scale infiltration, these measures risk alienating border communities that already feel marginalized. Without parallel investments in development, resentment could grow, creating fertile ground for extremist recruitment. In a region destabilized by coups in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger, instability in Côte d’Ivoire would be more than a domestic crisis—it would be a regional shockwave. The instability in the region reinforces the security dimension of the election. A disputed presidential election could further weaken the West African space, in a context of repeated coups d’état in the sub-region. .
ECOWAS: Key player or passive observer?
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which celebrated its 50th anniversary this year and beleaguered by the withdrawal of the AES states, has voiced concerns about the Cote d’Ivoire elections and pledged to send observers. But for many Ivorians, this is far from sufficient. ECOWAS’s credibility has been eroded by inconsistent responses to political crises—often remaining muted on term-limit extensions in the region, while proving powerless to halt military takeovers. “Be the referee now, or be the undertaker later.” That is the choice confronting the regional body. ECOWAS has been too soft toward incumbents, who are rarely held accountable for democratic regression ,and poor governance. .
The prevailing political climate in West Africa is unprecedentedly uncertain, as the neighbors exited the regional bloc and are experiencing strained diplomatic relations with Côte d’Ivoire. In the absence of proactive, high level political and diplomatic mediation, along with a focus on inclusion, transparency, and a depoliticized electoral process, ECOWAS risks being relegated to the role of symbolic spectator in a contest whose fallout could destabilize the entire region.
International and regional implications
The stakes of Côte d’Ivoire’s 2025 election extend well beyond its borders. As the world’s largest cocoa exporter and a major trade hub, the country’s stability directly affects global markets. Investor confidence, already strained by global uncertainty, could falter under prolonged political instability. Diplomatically, Côte d’Ivoire has been a vital partner to France, the EU, and the United States in trade and economic partnerships and regional security initiatives. Political unrest would complicate these alliances, particularly in counterterrorism operations. From a governance perspective, another term-limit extension in the region would embolden leaders elsewhere tempted to follow suit. It would cement a troubling precedent in which constitutional reforms become instruments of incumbency rather than safeguards of democracy. In addition, Russia’s active presence in the region, helping fight insurgents and coupled with growing anti French sentiments, could push the Kremlin to seize any opportunity to extend its influence in Cote d’Ivoire.
Meanwhile, presidential elections are also scheduled in Guinea and Guinea Bissau in 2025, with fears of unrest in Guinea and Guinea Bissau could have repercussions in Cote d’Ivoire and the rest of the region.
What’s at Stake
Cote d’Ivoire once again finds itself at a crossroads, haunted by unresolved political and socio-political grievances, incomplete national reconciliation process, and fragile democratic process. The danger is not only the potential for electoral violence but also the erosion of the democratic norms. When people believe their votes do not matter, they disengage—or they resist. Economically, uncertainty could stall infrastructure development and compromise investment. Politically, exclusionary tactics threaten to delegitimize the entire process before a single vote is cast. Security-wise, instability in Abidjan could embolden armed groups in the north and worsen the region’s already fragile security landscape. In addition, the strategy and response of Laurent Gbagbo and Tidjane Thiam following their definitive exclusion from the October polls is unclear. Meanwhile, Mr Gbagbo has initiated discussions with the main opposition parties. Will they call on their supporters to boycott the polls? The days and weeks ahead to the October 25 presidential poll will be crucial for Cote d’Ivoire and the region.
The Road Ahead
The exclusion of major opposition figures from Côte d’Ivoire’s 2025 presidential election raises serious questions about political inclusivity and the state of democracy in the country. As the election approaches, tensions are rising with both domestic and international actors watching closely. The poll is more than a contest between political figures—it is a referendum on Côte d’Ivoire’s democratic vitality. Will the nation choose renewal over repetition, dialogue over repression, inclusion over exclusion? The outcome will be shaped not only by Ouattara or the disqualified opposition leaders but also by ordinary Ivorians. The world must watch closely—not merely as observers, but as engaged observers prepared to speak out against injustice and exclusion. Ivorians must make their voices heard, loudly and without fear. As the Ghanaian novelist Ayi Kwei Armah once warned, “The beautiful ones are not yet born.” Whether they will be born in Côte d’Ivoire depends entirely on the outcome of the elections.
Recommendations to various stakeholders
Government of Côte d’Ivoire
- To ensure strong commitment to free, transparent, credible. Inclusive and peaceful elections
- Support civic education programs that explain the electoral process in collaboration with CSOs
- Ensure security of the elections, respect for human rights and protect citizens from jihadist attacks.
Political parties
- The heads of political parties should sign a code of conduct and make a public commitment that they reject any form of violence
- Commitment to established judicial procedures to contest election results
- Strengthening of civic and voter education of their supporters for peaceful and credible elections
Civil Society
- Embark on conflict prevention, social cohesion, early tracking of violence and hate speech
- Conduct civic and voter education and raise awareness for the participation of women, youth and persons living with disabilities in the election
- Participate in election monitoring and observation to ensure transparent and credible elections
Media
- Promote responsible journalism, combat disinformation and hate speech
Religious and Community leaders
- Religious and community leaders should imperatively engage all political actors and civil society organizations for dialogue, peaceful, inclusive and credible elections.
International partners
- The UN, AU and ECOWAS should step up their efforts to push for dialogue, inclusive and credible elections in collaboration with locally led initiatives by CSOs, religious and community leaders.
- Deploy election observation and monitoring missions to ensure credibility and transparency of the election
The author, Alhadji Abdoul Rahaman Diallo (Abdul Rahman Jalloh), is the Representative of the West African Center for Public Policy to the Mano River Union Countries.
